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Submission on “Insolvency reforms to support small business” 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission on the Exposure Draft of the Corporations 
Amendment (Corporate Insolvency Reforms) Bill 2020 (“the Bill”) and associated Explanatory 
Materials. This submission is my own (as an independent academic) and should not be attributed to 
UTS or UTS Law. 
Credentials 
I am a Senior Lecturer in Law at UTS Law (Sydney). I am a published insolvency law academic and 
have been a lecturer in insolvency law for six years. Prior to academia and two years as ARITA’s 
Legal Director, I spent 10 years as a solicitor in private practice with firms in Australia and the United 
Kingdom (qualified in both jurisdictions), specialising in insolvency law and commercial litigation.   
In my current role at UTS Law, I am the Program Head and principal lecturer of the “ARITA Advanced 
Certification”, a postgraduate-level course of study the completion of which fulfils the requirements laid 
down by the Insolvency Practice Rules (Corporations) 2016 (Cth) (“IPR”) s 20-1(2)(b) (academic 





Qualifications of the new “Small Business Restructuring Practitioner”: The importance of 
knowledge and education in insolvency law and practice 
As the program head and principal lecturer of Australia’s leading postgraduate course in insolvency 
law and practice, I have a unique perspective on the importance of insolvency education for aspiring 
practitioners as well as a deep understanding of the syllabus, curriculum, currency, standard and 
rigour (assessment) required of a postgraduate course that, upon successful completion, meets one of 
the legislated eligibility requirements for registration as a liquidator.  
Insolvency law and practice is a complex, broad and continually evolving (ever-changing) field of 
professional expertise. As well as the significant technical content, concepts, principles, understanding 
and application of insolvency law and practice that is studied in my postgraduate course, one module 
in the two course units (and a discrete assessment task) is dedicated to the study of ethics theory, 
applied professional ethics and “professionalism”.  Ethics and adherence to standards is an integral 
characteristic of a true “profession”.    
From this perspective, I submit that the qualifications and ethical compass of the new proposed 
“restructuring practitioner” will be of fundamental importance to the integrity and the success of the 
new restructuring procedure set out in proposed Part 5.3B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the 
Act’).  Apart from the importance of preventing and discouraging abuse of a streamlined procedure, 
the success of the new procedure in promoting the prospective approval of restructuring plans will not 
be achieved unless creditors (who will be voting on proposed plans) have confidence in the procedure 
and the practitioner who plays a central role in its implementation. To refer to one example, if the 
“restructuring practitioner” is to recommend a plan on the basis that it delivers a better outcome to 
creditors than a liquidation, that practitioner must have the requisite experience and knowledge of 
administering liquidations (including recovery actions, voidable transactions etc) so that creditors can 
reasonably rely upon the information presented by the practitioner. 
In a recent article (published in the December 2018 ARITA Journal) regarding the World Bank's 2018 
Report on MSME insolvency law reform1, I stated:2 
An aspect of the [World Bank] Report that has significance … is the emphasis upon the “integrity, 
transparency and competence of a country’s institutional framework and professionals” in the successful 
implementation of any MSME insolvency regime ... the success of any new regime will depend upon the 
confidence creditors can place in the insolvency practitioner as a trusted intermediary who will properly 
assess both the debtor’s bona fides and the substance of any proposal. 
                                                     
1 World Bank. 2018. ‘Saving Entrepreneurs, Saving Enterprises: Proposals on the Treatment of MSME Insolvency’ (English). 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 




For the above reasons, I agree with the current terms of the proposed Bill that the new “restructuring 
practitioner” must be a registered liquidator: new s 456B of the Act. Further, if any new class of 
registered liquidator were created, applicants for registration as a liquidator in that new class should, in 
my view, be required to meet the same “insolvency education” eligibility requirements currently 
required of applicants for registration as a liquidator, including the requirements of IPR s 20-1(2)(b). I 
note that, for “eligible solicitors” who may accept appointments as a controlling trustee under Part X of 
the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the required “courses in insolvency” approved by the Inspector 
General in Bankruptcy for the purposes of Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 reg 8.35 (by notice dated 25 
July 2018) are the two “courses in insolvency available from the Australian Restructuring Insolvency 
and Turnaround Association in partnership with the University of Technology Sydney: (a) 
Fundamentals of Restructuring, Insolvency and Turnaround; and (b) Advanced Insolvency”.  
My further comments and observations on the technical aspects of the exposure draft legislation and 
explanatory materials follow (on the basis of a limited review given the very short consultation period). 
I have also had an opportunity to review the submission of ARITA and I endorse its submission. 
Debt Restructuring Procedure (new Part 5.3B of the Corporations Act) 
• Section 453A: The circumstances of the “end” of a restructuring will be “prescribed by the 
regulations”. The draft Explanatory Materials (“EM”) at [1.8] contemplate that “if the plan is 
rejected, the restructuring process ends, and the company can seek to use an alternative 
formal insolvency process (such as liquidation or voluntary administration).” I submit that where 
a plan is rejected, there should be an automatic transition to a creditors’ voluntary liquidation. 
Section 455A provides that a company that proposes a restructuring plan is “taken to be 
insolvent” (not just “presumed” to be insolvent). Why then should there be any possibility of 
returning an insolvent company back to the control of directors to then decide whether to 
appoint a voluntary administrator or liquidator? Indeed, if that were to occur it creates an 
unnecessary duplication of cost and time.  If an automatic conversion to liquidation did exist, I 
note that this would add to the extensive power vested in the restructuring practitioner under s 
453J to terminate the restructuring (i.e., the restructuring practitioner could effectively convert 
the procedure to a winding up due to his/her belief on reasonable grounds as to the matters set 
out in that provision).  Indeed, one of those grounds is that the restructuring practitioner 
believes that “it would be in the interests of the creditors for the company to be wound up”. 
However, if there is no automatic transition to a CVL, it would be anomalous if a restructuring 
practitioner could form that view, and terminate the restructuring, but the ultimate decision to 
initiate a CVL be left in the hands of the directors; 
• Section 453C and EM [1.23]: The eligibility criteria – that no director of a company can use the 
procedure if he/she has been a director of another company that has used the new procedure 
– appears very strict and could render many small businesses ineligible simply on the basis of 




regulations). Presumably, there are many Australians that are directors of more than one small 
incorporated business; 
• Section 453M: Subparagraph (b) of this provision requires the addition of “ordinary course” 
transactions and dealings during the restructuring period so that these transactions and 
dealings are also valid and effectual and not liable to be set aside by the subsequent 
application of ss 468 or 501 of the Act (ie, if there is a subsequent liquidation that follows the 
restructuring period). This amendment to s 453M would align with the proposed consequential 
amendment (insertion) of ss 588FE(2C) which will provide that transactions entered into, or 
done, in the ordinary course of business during a restructuring (or with consent of the 
restructuring practitioner) cannot be recovered as a voidable transaction.  Some consideration 
may need to be given to the interaction of ss 453M and (new) 588FE(2C). Section 468(2) 
appears to also require further amendment to include “ordinary course” dealings during a 
restructuring as an “exempt disposition”.  
• Section 453P is the equivalent to s 440A in Part 5.3A.  I query whether this provision is 
appropriate to replicate for the new small business restructuring procedure. Nowadays, where 
a voluntary administrator is appointed just prior to the hearing of a pending winding up 
application, judges sometimes are prepared to refuse to adjourn the hearing and will proceed 
to wind up the company unless something more than a “mere speculative possibility" that it is 
in the interests of creditors for the administration to continue can be demonstrated.  While 
these decisions relating to s 440A clearly (and appropriately) address situations of a “last-
minute” appointment of an administrator following a statutory demand and winding up 
application, I query whether the nature and purpose of this new procedure will require a 
different approach from a judge when considering the adjournment of a winding up application. 
Indeed, as a matter of cost effectiveness, would an automatic and absolute adjournment under 
s 453P be appropriate and preferable to simplify the position? Many s 440A cases in courts 
regarding the appropriateness of an adjournment necessitate a significant volume of affidavit 
material: would it not be better to avoid this?3 Some would argue against an automatic 
adjournment on the basis that this would simply assist directors who wish to “prolong the 
inevitable” (liquidation). The new Part 5.3B procedure has a different complexion and purpose 
(see s 452A) in comparison to a Part 5.3A voluntary administration. I appreciate that 
reasonable policy arguments made on both sides; I simply raise the question whether it is 
suitable to simply replicate s 440A of Part 5.3A; 
• Section 553(1A): As the draft provisions currently stand, debts incurred in the ordinary course 
during the restructuring period will not be provable in any subsequent liquidation if creditors 
reject a proposed restructuring plan: ss 553(1A), 513A, 513B and 513CA. Section 553(1A) 
requires amendment to address this anomaly by adding (as provable claims) debts incurred 
                                                     




during a restructuring period in the ordinary course or with a restructuring practitioner’s 
consent;  
• Ipso facto stay (ss 454P ff): I note that there is provision for prescribed exceptions to the ipso 
facto stay. I submit that this new procedure would better fulfil its purpose and goals if the ipso 
facto stay provisions apply to pre-existing contracts (ie, contracts that were in place at the date 
of the commencement of Part 5.3B).  The fact that the Part 5.3A stay provisions do not apply to 
pre-1 July 2018 contracts significantly limits its effectiveness;  
• Section 453E: The nature and depth/scope of the restructuring practitioner’s “declaration to 
creditors” will be detailed in regulations. A comparative point of reference here is the 
certification required of a debt agreement administrator under the Bankruptcy Act: e.g., 
“reasonable grounds to believe “that all required information has been provided by the debtor: 
s 185C(2D). At the other end of the spectrum would be a required report along the lines of 
current IPR s 75-225 but that of course would carry significant cost; 
• Electronic notices: This amendment to s 600G appears sensible and long overdue. On my 
reading of the draft legislation, any appointee under any external administration will be able to 
send notices electronically to creditors where, upon appointment, the company’s books and 
records provide reasonable grounds for a belief that a particular electronic address (e.g., email 
address) exists for the purposes of a creditor receiving electronic communications (this 
scenario will fall within the definition of “nominated electronic address” in s 9 of the Act). 
Simplified Liquidation Procedure 
• Sections 500A to 500AD: In my view, related party creditors should be prescribed in the 
regulations as creditors that are not to be taken into account for the purposes of the “25% in 
value” threshold for creditors requesting that a liquidator not follow the simplified liquidation 
process;  
• Eligibility criteria under s 500A: I repeat the comments made above in relation to disqualifying a 
company solely on the basis that it has a common director with another company that has 
previously utilised the procedure. I understand the importance of preventing abuse but this 
seems very restrictive; 
• Trust property and the clarity of a liquidator’s power of sale: Neither the draft EM nor the draft 
legislation seeks to address one obvious matter which unnecessarily wastes time and costs in 
many “small liquidations”: The lack of clarity of a liquidator’s power of sale of trust assets under 
s 477 of the Act. As is well known, liquidators must often apply to court to be appointed 
receiver of the trust assets and the costs of such an application are often disproportionate to 
the total value of the very trust assets which are the subject of the application/liquidation. A 
simple amendment to s 477 of the Act could save a great deal of time and money on many 
“small” liquidations of corporate trading trustees. I would also recommend a specific provision 




trustee upon liquidation. These improvements to the Corporations Act were recommended by 
the Harmer Report in 1988;  
• Unfair preferences recoverable under ss 588FA and 588FE: Referring to [3.73] of the EM, 
rather than abolishing the recoverability of unfair preferences below a certain threshold or 
outside a certain period, preferential payments could instead be deemed void or absolutely 
repayable to a liquidator. Provision for “absolutely repayable” preferential payments would 
promote a cost-effective, streamlined liquidation procedure by: 
 
o Facilitating and promoting recoveries and pari passu distributions in a timely and cost-
effective manner by removing the prospect of the liquidator and “preferred” creditors 
engaging in the usual arguments regarding the “no reasonable grounds to suspect 
insolvency” defence under s 588FG; and 
o Better achieving the ultimate objective of the present unfair preference recovery action, 
namely fair allocation of the impact of a company’s insolvency by avoiding the effect of 
a transaction that gives one creditor an advantage over other creditors. 
Indeed, arguably there is a present anomaly in the Act by reason of s 569 of the Act which 
provides that a creditor who has issued execution against property of the company within six 
months prior to a winding up “must pay to the liquidator an amount equal to the amount 
received by the creditor as a result of the execution". In a streamlined liquidation process, why 
should there not be a provision for the recovery of preferential payments cast in similar, 
absolute terms? At the very least, preferential payments to related party creditors – within a 
certain period prior to the liquidation – could be deemed void and/or automatically repayable 
instead of remaining subject to the present s 588FA and s 588FG defences. 
I am more than happy to speak to any of the above points (or my submission generally) and can be 
contacted by email or via UTS Law.  
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Mark Wellard 
